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ABSTRACT:  In some recent papers I have been arguing that the concept ‘good-for’ is prior 
to the concept of ‘good’ (in the sense in which final ends are good), and exploring the 
implications of that claim. One of those implications is that everything that is good is good 
for someone. That implication seems to fall afoul of our intuitions about certain cases, such 
as the intuition that a world full of happy people and animals is better than a world full of 
miserable ones, even if the people and animals are different in the two cases, so that there is 
no one for whom the second world is better.  Such cases tempt people to think that there 
must be impersonal goods, and that what it means to say that something is good for you is 
that you are the one who ‘has’ some impersonal good.  In this paper, I argue that if we 
approach  things  in  this  way,  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  the  ‘having’  consists  of,  what 
relation it names.  This leads me to a discussion of various things we do mean by saying that 
something is good for someone, how they are related to each other, and what sorts of 
entities can ‘have a good.’  Finally, I explain why we think that a world full of happy people 
and animals is better than a world full of miserable ones, even if the people and animals are 
different in the two cases.    
 On Having a Good 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
 
1. Introduction 
  You are the kind of entity for whom things can be good or bad.  This is one of the 
most important facts about you.  It provides you with the grounds for taking a passionate 
interest in your own life, for you are deeply concerned that things should go well for you.  
Presumably, you also want to do well, but that may be in part because you think that doing 
well is good for you, and that your life would be impoverished if you did not.
1  But even if 
your  interest  in  doing  well  is  completely  independent  of  any  reference  to  your  own 
condition, it probably depends on the thought that there are other entities, entities who are 
dependent upon you or affected by you, for whom things can be good or bad.  It is only 
because  there  are  entities  like  you,  entities  for  whom  things  can  be  good  or  bad,  that 
anything is important at all.  If there were no entities for whom things can be good or bad, 
nothing would matter. 
  What I have just said may sound rather obvious, but in fact, it is controversial.  Many 
philosophers believe that things can be good or bad without being good or bad for anyone or 
anything in particular.  They think, for instance, that the world is a better place if it is full of 
happy people and animals than if it has no inhabitants at all, or only miserable ones.  Or they 
think that it is better if wealth is distributed more equally than if some people are very rich 
and some very poor.  If things like these are true, you might suppose, then there must be 
                                                 
1 Actually, it follows from the view I defend in this paper that it is necessarily true that doing 
well is good for you, or at least that you cannot achieve your good without doing well. See 
section 5.  On Having a Good 
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what are sometimes called ‘impersonal’ goods.  Then you will probably think it is important 
that such goods should be realized, even though there is no one for whom they are good.   
  What I have just said may seem puzzling.  Isn’t it better if the world is full of happy 
people and animals, because it is better for those people and animals? And isn’t it better if 
wealth is distributed equally, because it is better for the people who would otherwise be 
poor?  The trouble with the first of those claims – that the world is better if it is full of 
happy people and animals because it is better for those people and animals – is that it is 
unclear that the world would be the worse for those people and animals, if they did not exist 
at all.  Are all of the people and animals who never existed, and never will, in an unfortunate 
condition?  Is that a bad thing for them?  What a miserable place the world must be, if that is 
the case!  But surely, you will reply, it is better if the world is full of happy people and 
animals than of miserable ones?  But for whom is it better?  If we are comparing two worlds 
containing the same inhabitants, in one of which those inhabitants are miserable and in one 
of which they are happy, the second world is clearly better for them.  But suppose we are not 
comparing two worlds with the same inhabitants. If you are miserable, would it better for you 
if you were replaced by someone who is not?  As for the second claim, of course it is better 
for the people who would otherwise be poor if wealth were distributed more equally.  But by 
the same token, it would be worse for the people who would otherwise be rich.
2   
                                                 
2 This may be false, of course: it may be better for each and every one of us to live in a world 
where wealth is more equally distributed. Being wealthier than others may corrupt your 
character so that you are less capable of genuine happiness, for instance. Or if you are good 
enough to be happy, knowing that you have more than your share may make you unhappy. 
But in that case equal distributions would be better for individuals, and the example would On Having a Good 
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  It seems, then, difficult to explain why we are tempted to think that a world full of 
happiness is better than a world full of misery, or that equitable distributions of wealth are 
better than lopsided ones, if we hang on to the intuition that things are only good or bad 
because they are good or bad for someone.  On the other hand, it seems strange to suppose 
that these things matter, if there is no one to whom they matter.   
There is another problem as well. Suppose things are good or bad independently of 
any entities for whom they are good or bad: that is, suppose that the notion of ‘good’ is 
conceptually prior to the notion of ‘good-for’.
3  Then what does it mean to be an entity for 
                                                                                                                                               
not, after all, pose a challenge to the idea that things must be good or bad for someone if 
they are good or bad at all.  
3 Many people seem to think that there are both personal and impersonal goods, and that 
there is no conceptual priority relation between them.  I think this is a non-starter.  Why do 
we call them both by the same name? Is it because it is impersonally good that the personal 
goods should be realized? If that is not always so – and presumably, it would not be – then 
why do we call the personal goods ‘good’ in those cases where it is not?  One might adopt 
what  Tim  Scanlon  calls  a  buck-passing  theory  of  the  good,  and  then  try  to  argue  that 
whether the good is personal or not depends on whether the reasons are personal or not. 
(See T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
Chapter 2, especially p 97ff.) But in my view, the question what it means to ‘have’ a reason 
gives rise to problems that are parallel to those that arise from the question what it means to 
‘have’ a good. Later I will explain why I think ‘having a good’ is prior to the existence of 
‘goods.’  Kantians believe that you have a reason when you have made something your 
maxim. In that case the condition of ‘having a reason’ is also prior to the existence of On Having a Good 
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whom things can be good or bad?  Presumably, it means that you stand in some important 
relation to the goodness or badness of certain things, but what relation, exactly, is it? It 
cannot  be  simply  that  you  are  aware  of  these  goods  and  evils,  or  perceive  them,  and 
appreciate their good or bad character.  For even if the poor are very generous-minded, and 
are glad to think of the happy condition of the rich, they seem to stand in a different relation 
to the happy condition of the rich than the rich themselves do.   
In order for something to be good for a certain person, you will want to reply, he has 
to be the one who has it.  But that just raises the same question again.  What relation are we 
talking about, when we talk about this ‘having’?
4  The strange fact that we talk about moral 
matters in terms borrowed from economics – ‘value,’ ‘obligation,’ ‘owes,’ and so on – may 
lull us into supposing that we have some clear notion of ownership to work with in this case.  
But the notion of property-ownership will not help us out here, for to say that something is 
your property is to say that you may use it or enjoy it and that no one else may use it or 
enjoy it without your permission. But this is not what we mean when we say that your 
happiness is your own good.  For even though the happiness of the rich is the good of the 
rich and not of the poor, the generous-minded among the poor are certainly free to enjoy 
the happiness of the rich if they can, and do not need the rich’s permission for that.   
                                                                                                                                               
‘reasons.’ For some relevant discussion, see my ‘Valuing Our Humanity’, §2, English version 
forthcoming.  The paper is available in Spanish translation by Dulce María Grande in Signos 
Filosoficos, No. 26, July-December 2011.  
4 See Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), §4.3.3, 146-147.  On Having a Good 
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There is a question, then, about what it means to have a good – to be the kind of 
being for whom things can be good or bad.  There is also a question about which things can 
be the kind of entity for whom things can be good or bad.  After all, one way out of the 
dilemmas I’ve just been discussing would be to suppose that something like ‘containing 
happy people and animals’ could be good for the universe itself, or, perhaps more plausibly, 
that equitable distributions could be good for the community. But if this way out of the 
dilemma does not work, or if it does not seem to correctly capture our reasons for favoring 
those things, then there are also questions about what, if anything, does explain why we 
favor those things. These are the questions I will investigate in this paper: questions about 
what it means to have a good, what kinds of entities can have one, and how we can explain 
those cases in which things seem to be good or bad without being good or bad for anyone in 
particular. 
 
2. Why Having a Good Must Be Prior to Good
5 
  I will begin from the question what it means to be the kind of entity for whom 
things can be good or bad.  Essentially there are two possible views about this; in this section 
I will consider the first. The first view, which I have already mentioned and cast some doubt 
on, holds that some things are good or bad independently of their goodness or badness for 
anyone or anything in particular.  Then to be the kind of entity for whom things can be good 
                                                 
5 For another version of the argument of this section see Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘The 
Relational Nature of the Good’, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8, ed. 
Russ Schafer-Landau (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2013.  
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or bad is to be capable of standing in some particular relation to certain good or bad things. 
Focusing on aesthetic cases can make this option initially seem tempting.  La Traviata or Van 
Gogh’s Starry Night or the Taj Mahal are good things, and to be the kind of entity for whom 
these things can be good or bad is to be the kind of entity who is capable of appreciating 
exactly  that  fact  about  them.  Because  you  are  capable  of  appreciating  aesthetic  value, 
exposure to beauty to is good for you, while having ugliness thrust upon you is bad. Because 
rabbits and squirrels are not capable of appreciating aesthetic value, or anyway not of the 
kind in question, operas and paintings and architectural masterpieces are nothing to them. 
The rabbit can appreciate the flavor and texture of a carrot, or the squirrel that of a nut, so 
these things kinds of things can be good for such creatures.  But isn’t the experience of 
appreciation or enjoyment itself also a good thing for the creature who is capable of it?  After 
all, isn’t it better to enjoy than to suffer, or to appreciate than to be repulsed? But is that 
because a creature who is capable of appreciating things is also capable of appreciating his 
own  appreciation,  or  enjoying  his  own  enjoyment?  But  then  are  these  second-order 
appreciations and enjoyments also good for the creature, and if so, what makes them so?  
There is clearly no point in starting off on that endless regress.  But that leaves us stuck 
where we were: if the capacity to appreciate or enjoy something is what makes it good for 
you, what makes appreciation and enjoyment themselves good for you? 
  We can see a pattern here.  Many people find it natural to suppose that what makes 
something good for you is that it makes you happy.  But they also suppose that your own 
happiness is a good thing for you.  For it is surely better for you to be happy than sad. Is that 
because being happy makes you happy?  This little conundrum may be what drives people to On Having a Good 
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the ownership theory that I mentioned earlier:  happiness, they say, is a good thing in itself, 
and what makes a bit of happiness good for you is that it is yours.  
But, as I argued before, we then need to explicate what it means to say that the 
happiness is yours.  What relation is that?  As I said before, it is not the ordinary ownership 
relation, the relation of standing in normative control over the use of a thing.  It also seems 
odd to analogize happiness to property for other reasons.  Could there be unowned bits of 
happiness lying around, the way there were once unowned bits of real estate?
6 Following 
John Locke, shall we say that you may lay claim to a piece of happiness, only if you make 
sure you leave enough and as good for others?
7  From a moral point of view, it might be 
pleasant to believe that, but declining a piece of happiness is not a way of ensuring that it is 
there for someone else.
8  All happiness is someone’s happiness: the idea of happiness is an 
inherently relational idea.  To say that your happiness is yours is not to say that you stand in 
                                                 
6 I’ve worded it this way because, strictly speaking, there is no property that is not someone’s 
property, any more than there is happiness that is not someone’s happiness. Property is a 
relational notion.  But it does in a sense name a relation between two independently existing 
things.  
7 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 
Chapter V, paragraph 33, 21.  
8 Declining some thing that would make you happy can be a way of ensuring that it is there 
for someone else, of course, and if it would make that other person happy then this is a case 
where you can trade in your happiness to secure that of someone else.  But that really is a 
very different point: it does not show that happiness is a good thing in itself like a piece of 
property that becomes good for you when you claim it for your own.  On Having a Good 
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a special relation to some piece of happiness that would otherwise be free-floating or belong 
to someone else.  And if happiness is the good, that means that to say that something is 
good for you is not to say that you stand in a special relationship to something good that 
would otherwise be free-floating, or belong to someone else. 
  Now of course some people assert, and some deny, that happiness is the good. If 
this debate is about anything, the term ‘happiness’ must refer to something more specific 
than just ‘whatever is good for someone.’ Many people think it refers in particular to the 
quality of our experiences, and has something to do with their being pleasant rather than 
painful.  Then people who deny that happiness is the good are protesting against the idea 
that all that matters is the quality of our experiences, while the people who think happiness is 
the good are convinced that unless we experience something, at least indirectly, it can have 
no impact on us whatever.   
But we do not need to enter this familiar debate, for everything I said before about 
happiness can be said about pleasure.  We can claim that what makes something good for 
you  is  that  it  provides  you  with  pleasant  experiences.    But  that  cannot  be  what  makes 
pleasant experiences themselves good for you. That little conundrum may drive us into an 
ownership theory of pleasure:  pleasure is a good thing, and what makes it good for you is 
that it is yours.  But then again, we have to ask what the ownership consists in.  Here the 
tempting answer will be that you are the one who experiences it.  But again, it is not as if 
there is some unexperienced pleasure lying around, and being the one who experiences it is 
laying some sort of a claim to it.
9  All pleasure is someone’s pleasure: the idea of pleasure is 
                                                 
9 If someone thanks you for doing something, and you reply, ‘The pleasure is all mine’, you 
are not saying something crassly selfish.  On Having a Good 
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an inherently relational idea.  To say that your pleasure is yours is not to say that you stand in 
a special relation to some piece of pleasure.  If pleasure were the good, that would mean that 
to say that something is good for you is not to say that you stand in a special relationship to 
something good. And while we are at it, experience is relational too: so to say that you are 
the one who has a certain experience is not to say that there is some experience to which you 
stand in a special relation.  So what makes something your good cannot be that you are the 
one who experiences it. 
I have been arguing that to say that something is your good cannot be to say that 
there is some good to which you stand in a special relation, a relation at which we gesture by 
saying that you are the one who ‘has’ that good.  I can imagine someone thinking that he can 
show that this form of argument must be wrong.  Take the following comparison:  If Aristotle 
is right in arguing that a dead hand is not really a hand at all, then every real hand must be 
someone’s hand.
10  Yet, surely, we can still say that what makes something your hand is that 
you are the one who has it?  But, no, actually we cannot, for there is still the problem of what 
the right kind of ‘having’ consists in. We can imagine all kinds of macabre ways in which you 
                                                 
10 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.10 1035b23-25: ‘for it is not a finger in any state that is the finger of 
a living thing, but a dead finger is a finger only homonymously.’ Politics 1.2 1253a20-25: ‘if 
the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as we 
might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that.’ On the 
Soul 2.1 412b20-22: ‘when seeing is removed, the eye is no longer an eye, except in name – 
no more than the eye of a statue or a painted figure.’ The translations are from The Complete 
Works  of  Aristotle:  The  Revised  Oxford  Translation,  edited  by  Jonathan  Barnes.  Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1984.  On Having a Good 
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could ‘have’ a hand that would not make it yours in the sense we want here. Only when we 
hit on the right relation – the right kind of ‘having’ – would the hand really be, by Aristotle’s 
criterion, a hand at all.
 11  What this shows is that the condition of ‘having a hand’ is prior to 
the hand itself.  So the important point here is not merely that everything that is good must 
be  someone’s  good:  it  is  that  everything  that  is  good  must  be  related  to  someone  in  a 
particular way before it can really be something good at all.  That shows that the condition of 
‘having a good’ is prior to the good itself.  That is why I am claiming that someone’s being in 
a condition of having a good, or something’s being good for someone, is prior to the good 
itself. 
 
3. Two Senses of Good for You 
  I started from the claim that there are two possible views about what it is to be an 
entity who has a good. The first holds that some things are good or bad independently of 
their goodness or badness for anyone or anything in particular, and that to be the kind of 
entity for whom things can be good or bad is to be capable of standing in some particular 
relation to those good and bad things.  We have now seen what is wrong with that theory.  
This brings us to the other view, which is that the notion of good-for is more fundamental 
than the notion of good, and that for something to be good is essentially for it to be related 
to someone in a particular way. 
                                                 
11 ‘For it is not a hand in any state that is a part of man, but the hand which can fulfill its 
work, which therefore must be alive; if it is not alive, it is not a part.’ Aristotle, Metaphysics 
7.10, 1036b30-32.  On Having a Good 
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But before I can say what that particular way is, I need to distinguish two apparently 
different things we might mean when we say that something is good for someone.  Suppose 
Alfred and Bertrand are competing for a position, and Alfred gets it.  That, we say, is good 
for Alfred, but bad for Bertrand. To be clear here, I am not imagining that the position is 
one that Alfred and Bertrand want just because, say, it carries a salary.  I’m imagining it as a 
coveted position, one in which a person might engage in worthwhile activity and distinguish 
himself at the same time, a position that might be the basis of a good life. When we use 
‘good for Alfred’ in this kind of case, we are using it in the way I have been using it up until 
now in this paper.  We mean that getting the position will be a source of pleasure for Alfred 
or will make him happy, or that it is part of things going well for him, or that it is part of 
what makes his life a good one for him.  We mean to put Alfred’s getting the position in the 
same category of things in which hedonists put pleasure and eudaimonists put happiness, the 
category of things that are good for their own sake or things that constitute such goods or 
contribute to them.  To say that things are good in this sense is to mark their relation to 
things we might decide to pursue for their own sakes.  So although the term isn’t perfect for 
my purposes, I am going to call this the ‘final’ sense of good-for.
12    
                                                 
12 ‘Final’ is a slightly misleading name, since it turns out that both ends and means can be 
good in the way that I am trying to identify here.  As will become clear, I mean goods that 
seem or can seem worthy of pursuit from the agent’s point of view, whether for their own 
sake or for the sake of something else, something that is a final good in the more ordinary 
sense.  Nevertheless, in what follows I will sometimes use ‘final’ in the more ordinary sense, 
to refer to goods sought for their own sake. I don’t think this will cause any confusion.  On Having a Good 
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On the other hand, when Alfred’s mother informs him that broccoli is good for him, 
she does not mean to put broccoli in the same category in which hedonists put pleasure and 
eudaimonists put happiness. She does not mean that eating broccoli is part of the human 
good  in  the  way  that  aesthetic  experiences,  happy  marriages,  and  lives  full  of 
accomplishment and pleasure are part of the human good.  She does not mean that either 
broccoli itself, or eating broccoli, is a final good.  It is possible that that is true, I suppose, 
but nevertheless, it is not what she means. She means, more or less, that broccoli is healthy, 
and that it will make Alfred healthy.  I am going to call this, for now anyway, the ‘motherly’ 
sense of good-for, as opposed to the final sense. 
Now you may be tempted to think that the difference here is just a matter of degree, 
a question of how directly the thing benefits Alfred.  Actually, there are two ways to hold this 
view.  A crude sort of hedonist thinks that pleasure, thought of as some particular kind of 
sensation, is the final good, and everything else is related to that final good causally.  In that 
case everything but pleasure itself is instrumental to the final good, and the difference of 
degree in question here is a matter of instrumental or causal distance. Eating broccoli causes 
you to be healthy, which makes you capable of engaging in certain other activities, which in 
turn cause the sensation of pleasure. A less crude hedonist, however, might think that the 
relationship between pleasure and activity is not one in which the activity causes a certain 
sensation,  but  one  in  which  the  pleasure  is  somehow  a  characteristic  of  the  activities 
themselves.
13 Even so, this less crude hedonist might think that the difference between the 
way in which the pleasurable activities are good for you and the way in which broccoli is 
good for you is a matter of the directness of the benefit.  Dancing a waltz with a handsome 
                                                 
13 See Aristotle’s discussions in the Nicomachean Ethics at 7.11-12 and 10.1-5.  On Having a Good 
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partner is the sort of thing that constitutes the good for you directly, while eating broccoli is 
good for you too but less directly:  it promotes your health, which equips you for enjoying 
such activities as dancing waltzes with handsome partners, as well of course as helping you 
to ward off pain. 
 But  there  are  two  problems  with  the  idea  that  what  we  have  here  is  simply  a 
difference of degree in the directness of the benefit.  The first is that the kinds of theories 
that  make  this  way  of  thinking  seem  natural  are  exactly  the  ones  that  landed  us  in  the 
quagmire  we  have  just  left  behind:    they  leave  nothing  for  the  claim  that  pleasure  or 
pleasurable activities or happiness are themselves good for you to mean.  On this theory, we 
would have to identify a final good as the thing that is most directly related to – well, to 
what? – to your final good, of course – and so we would get stuck in a circle.   
So let’s grant that the difference between saying that getting the job is good for 
Alfred in the final sense and saying that broccoli is good for Alfred in the motherly sense is 
not just a matter of how directly the thing in question benefits Alfred.  What then is the 
difference? You might be tempted to say that even though we have not yet figured out quite 
what we mean when we say that something is good for Alfred in the final sense, it is still 
clear enough what we mean when we say that something is good for Alfred in the motherly 
sense.  We mean that it is instrumental – that it promotes some final good that is valued for its 
own sake. That is what Alfred’s mother is saying about eating broccoli.   
I  don’t  think  that  is  right,  however,  and  this  brings  me  to  the  second  problem.  
According to the theory on offer, eating broccoli promotes Alfred’s health, and Alfred’s 
health in turn promotes his ability to engage in the kinds of activities that somehow directly 
constitute his final good.  Keep in mind that the question is not merely whether all of that is On Having a Good 
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true, but rather, whether that is what Alfred’s mother is saying when she says that broccoli is 
good for him.  That’s what doesn’t seem right to me.  For suppose that Alfred’s lover has 
left him to take up with Bertrand, and Alfred is feeling suicidal. ‘Eat your broccoli,’ his 
mother urges. ‘It’s good for you.’  According to the theory on offer, Alfred should say, ‘No, 
it isn’t.  Since all I want to do is die, the benefits of eating broccoli are completely irrelevant 
to me, or maybe they are even bad, since they will tend to keep me alive.’  But of course, 
that’s not what Alfred actually going to say. What he actually is going to say is, ‘Yes, but I 
don’t care.’ 
Perhaps you think this is just because Alfred is not sufficiently reflective, and the use 
of  the  phrase  ‘good  for  you’  to  mean  something  like  ‘promotes  your  health’  is  so  well 
established, idiomatically, that he fails to question the suitability of the claim to his own case.  
A more philosophical Alfred would say the first thing: that his mother has made a wrong 
calculation about what will benefit him.  But in my view the second Alfred, the more likely 
Alfred, has got it right.  Alfred is not explaining to his mother that she has made an error in 
calculation.  He is declaring that, being in despair, he does not care about himself, and so 
does not care about what is good for him. ‘Good for you’ in the motherly sense of ‘Broccoli 
is  good  for  you’  does  mean  something  like  ‘promotes  your  health,’  not  something  like 
‘indirectly promotes your final good.’   
The only problem is that ‘promotes your health’ is a little too specific, even for the 
motherly use of the phrase.  For one thing, even in the motherly sense, we often generalize 
the idea to include psychological health, as when we say, ‘It is precisely because you are so 
depressed that it would be good for you to get out and see people more.’  Even in the 
motherly sense, we sometimes generalize the idea even further to include moral and spiritual On Having a Good 
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health, as when we say, for instance, ‘You have been so successful that it is really good for 
you to be taken down a peg now and then.’  
But the problem is not merely that the proposed definition of the motherly sense of 
‘good for you’ as ‘promotes your health’ might be taken to be limited to physical health.  It is 
also that – or so I claim – we can use the phrase in the motherly sense to talk about things 
that are not good by way of promoting, or at least not merely by way of promoting, anything 
at all. This point is a little harder to motivate, but let me give it a try.  For one thing, I think 
that we sometimes say, in the same spirit as Alfred’s mother, that it is good for people to 
enjoy themselves sometimes, or to contemplate natural beauty, or to go to museums to 
appreciate  art  or  to  learn  something  about  the  world  they  live  in.    That  is  to  say,  we 
sometimes recommend these things, not as things that would be good for people in the 
sense of making them happy, but in the sense of being somehow healthy.  Yet these things 
are not mere means that promote some other state.  
Well, you may reply, that is no problem.  Many things are both means and ends.  
When we say that these things are good for people in the same spirit in which Alfred’s 
mother  says  that  broccoli  is  good  for  Alfred,  we  mean  that  they  promote  people’s 
psychological, moral, and spiritual health, and so are means.  But when we say that they are 
good for people in the spirit in which we said that it was good for Alfred but bad for 
Bertrand that Alfred got the position, we mean they are also ends.  The motherly use of 
good-for applies to the means to various kinds of health, while the final use of good-for 
applies to ends, which, as it happens, sometimes coincide with the means to various kinds of 
health.   On Having a Good 
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But I don’t think it’s quite that simple.  For consider that in the resulting story, it is 
good for people to enjoy themselves sometimes, contemplate natural beauty, go to museums 
to appreciate art and learn something about the world they live in, so that they achieve a 
state we call ‘health,’ which in turn promotes their ability to enjoy themselves sometimes, 
contemplate natural beauty, and go to museums to appreciate art or learn something about 
the world they live in.  What sort of a merry-go-round, you might ask, are we on here?   
The answer, of course, is that it is the same sort of merry-go-round that the classical 
Greek philosophers, at least Plato and Aristotle, thought we were on with respect to the 
moral virtues.  What the practice of moral virtue makes us capable of, according to Plato and 
Aristotle, is virtuous activity itself.  In fact for this very reason, Plato and Aristotle frequently 
compared moral virtue to health.  
This comparison will help us to see that the problem rests in the characterization of 
health as a means.  In The Practice of Value, Joseph Raz suggests at one point that health is a 
means to personal survival.
14  No one survives, of course, but I suppose we could view 
health as a means to an extended life.  Few people, however, wish for an extended life unless 
they can be assured of a reasonable degree of health. Do we then want health as a means to 
living a reasonably healthy life?  Taking our cue from virtue, we can see that the right thing 
to say here is not that health is valued as a means to an extended life but rather, that it is 
valued as the excellence, or the goodness, of your physical life.   
                                                 
14 Raz, The Practice of Value (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 2003), 16.  Of course Raz grants that 
one may value health for other reasons as well.  See my commentary on his remarks at 77-81 
of that volume for background to the thoughts here.  On Having a Good 
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There are two reasons why this is the right thing to say.  One is that it is very nearly a 
tautology to say that good health will extend your life, and claims about means are not 
normally tautologies.
15  Although obviously health does not guarantee the extension of life – 
you can always get hit by a meteorite – we should not call a condition ‘healthy’ if it did not 
tend to maintain or extend life.  The other is that it explains the pair of judgments I just 
mentioned – that people try to be healthy in order to extend their lives but only if their lives 
will be healthy ones.  The explanation is simply that people want to extend reasonably good 
physical lives but do not usually want to extend bad ones unless there is some special reason.  
For of course health can be a means to something in particular – if you want to survive long 
enough to finish writing your masterpiece, or to raise a late-born child to adulthood, say – 
but that thought is most natural when you have come to regard your physical life itself as a 
means to something in particular, to some other aspect of your life.  But in the ordinary case, 
we do not think of health as a means to something, but rather as simply one form of the 
goodness of your life, namely, the goodness of your physical life.  When we generalize the 
motherly use of ‘good for you’ to broader forms of life, to the psychological and the spiritual 
and the moral, then we are talking about the goodness of your life quite generally. In the 
motherly sense, when we say that something is good for you, we mean that it either causes 
or constitutes your overall well-functioning, in some dimension of life.  
                                                 
15 If we generalize the instrumental relation to include the constitutive one, then there are 
cases  where  claims  about  means  are  tautologies,  namely  where  there  is  a  necessary 
constituent.  It is a tautology that your vote is needed if the end is 100% voter turnout, say. 
Some philosophers also think that performing an action is, tautologously, a means to the 
performance of that action.  On Having a Good 
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So does this mean that I am after all suggesting that there is no difference between 
the final use of ‘good for you’ and the motherly use of ‘good for you,’ no difference between 
what Alfred’s mother is saying when she says broccoli is good for him and what we are 
saying when we say that getting the position is good for him?  Not quite.  What I am 
suggesting is that the final sense and the motherly sense of ‘good for you’ mention the same 
set of facts, but from two different perspectives.  From one of these perspectives, we view 
Alfred as a functional system, that is, an entity whose parts and lesser systems all contribute 
to  the  achievement  of  some  end  or  ends,  in  some  cases  simply  to  the  maintenance  or 
continuation of that functional system itself.  From the other, we view the things that are 
good for Alfred from Alfred’s own point of view.  It is because these two perspectives can 
come together that there is such a thing as the good.  Let me explain. 
 
4. Goodness and Functional Systems 
The association of the idea of the good with the idea of a functional system goes 
back at least to Plato and Aristotle.  To say that something is a good X, they believed, is to 
say that it has the properties that enable it to perform its function well.
16  Here we are using 
‘good’ in an ordinary evaluative sense: a good knife is sharp; a good car is safe and gets good 
gas mileage; a good teacher is patient and attentive; a good watchdog is fierce and loyal.  A 
living thing just as such may also be viewed as a functional system, as Aristotle taught us:  we 
can view its function as a kind of self-maintenance, or survival and reproduction, or as 
                                                 
16 For Aristotle, see especially Nicomachean Ethics 1.7; for Plato see Republic Book I, 352d-
354b.  On Having a Good 
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leading the life characteristic of its kind.  We are viewing the living thing as that kind of 
functional system when we evaluate its condition as healthy or not.   
But it is not merely the case that functional systems are the sort of thing that can be 
evaluatively good or bad; it also appears to follow from the way in which functional systems 
can be good or bad that things can be good or bad for them, in the motherly sense.  Being 
driven once in a while is good for a car, while low-quality gasoline is bad for it. Earthworms 
and rain are good for the soil, and fresh air and exercise are good for both you and your dog. 
If something is a functional system, the properties that enable it to perform its function well 
are the properties that make it a good one, and the conditions that tend to promote and 
protect those properties are good for it.  So functional systems, by their very nature, have a 
good.  They have a good in the motherly sense of having a good – the sense in which 
broccoli  is  good  for  Alfred.    Now  recall  that  I  said  that  the  motherly  sense  could  be 
extended to talk about things that affect a person or an animal’s psychological health, or a 
person’s moral and spiritual condition.  When we say, ‘you have been so successful, it is 
really good for you to be taken down a peg now and then,’ are we thinking of the person as a 
functional system?  I think we are.  The implication is that the build-up of self-satisfaction 
may eventually clog the person’s moral arteries so much that it will interfere with his ability 
to keep on doing as well as he has.    
If the idea of being good for something is linked to the idea of a functional system, 
where  does  the  idea  of  a  functional  system  come  from?    Does  it  name  something  we 
encounter in experience, a substance like water or a property like blue?   It would seem not, 
for the idea is too deeply rooted in the way we see the world for that. I cannot treat this 
topic properly here, but let me gesture at the very large issues that I have in mind.  Aristotle On Having a Good 
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thought that for a thing to be unified in the way that a thing has to be unified in order to 
count as a thing at all – that is, an ousia (oὐσία), or a substance – is for it to be a kind of 
functional system.
17  This makes the idea a basic metaphysical one.  In the Critique of Judgment, 
Kant suggests, speaking a bit roughly, that the exercise of reflective judgment – the kind of 
judgment we use to form concepts of the kinds of things that there are, as opposed to the 
kind we use to place objects under concepts we already have – anyway, reflective judgment, 
or concept formation, involves interpreting some things as functional systems within the 
manifold of experience. Kant’s idea is really the same as Aristotle’s, with the characteristic 
Kantian  twist  of  making  the  principle  of  substantial  unity,  functional  unity,  one  that 
emanates outward from us rather than one that we encounter in nature.
18 If these ideas are 
right, then the idea of a functional system is roughly what Plato called the Form of the 
Good, the organizing principle at the basis of all objects or of our ways of conceptualizing 
them. Except, of course, for the fact that something is not good absolutely simply by virtue 
of being a functional system, even a functional system that is good or perfect of its kind.  
After all, a nuclear bomb or an assassin may be perfect of its kind.  But a functional system is 
still the form of something, if what I’ve just said is right – it is the form of having a good.  
 
                                                 
17 I defend this claim in ‘Aristotle’s Function Argument’ in Christine M. Korsgaard, The 
Constitution of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
18 For further discussion, see Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution:  Agency,  Identity,  and 
Integrity (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), chapter 2.  On Having a Good 
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5. Goodness and Agency 
Now that’s still having a good in what I have been calling the motherly sense – the 
sense in which ‘good for you’ means something like ‘enables you to function well.’  So now 
I’m going to switch from calling that good for you in the ‘motherly’ sense to calling it good 
for you in the ‘functional sense.’ Something is good for you in the functional sense if it 
maintains, promotes, or enhances your functioning.  In order to get at ‘good for you’ in the 
final sense, we need to talk about another way in which we use the concept of the good.  In 
my paper, ‘Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy,’ I argue 
that we use normative concepts to mark out schematically the solutions to certain kinds of 
problems which we have to solve.
19  I take my cue from John Rawls, who argued that we use 
the concept of ‘justice’ to mark out the solution to the problem of how the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation are to be distributed. ‘Justice’ is our word for whatever solves 
that problem, and philosophers who argue about what justice is are arguing about how that 
problem ought to be solved.
20 
Now the fact that we are reflective agents who do not automatically do what desire 
and instinct prompt us to do also confronts us with problems.  For as a reflective agent, you 
cannot treat the bare fact that something attracts you as a reason to try to go for it without 
further ado.  Nor can you treat the fact that an act would promote some end you’ve decided 
to go for as settling the question what you should do, for the act that promotes your end 
might not be, in various ways, worth it. There might be prudential or moral costs.  So we 
                                                 
19 In Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency.  
20 Among other things, this solves the problem about what philosophers who define justice 
completely differently are disagreeing about.  On Having a Good 
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have to have some way of making these decisions, some procedure or principle to follow. 
These two problems are the problems of the good and the right respectively – the problem 
of what to go for, and the problem of what to do.  They are not of course completely 
independent, because you cannot actually decide to go for something without first deciding 
that that there’s some way of going for it – that is, some act that would promote or achieve it 
– that you might conceivably find it worth deciding to do.
21 But of course you also cannot 
even generate some candidate actions to consider without first settling on some things you 
might like to go for. So insofar as we are agents, we are faced with these two interlocking 
problems. I want you to keep in mind that the two problems are interlocking, because that 
will matter later on.    
Why do we use the same word – ‘good’ – when we are talking about the success of 
functional systems and when we are talking about the things we’ve decided to go for?  There 
seems to be a curious sort of interdependence between two ideas at work here, the idea of a 
functional system and the idea of an agent.  When we regard an object as a functional 
system, we are regarding it rather as if it were a kind of agent, and the purpose that it serves 
as if it were an end that it had decided to go for.  It is as if behind our division of the world 
into objects lurked a form of primitive animism, a determination to view the world as being 
full of agents like ourselves.   
                                                 
21 That is what Kant called ‘the paradox of method’ and Rawls called ‘the priority of the 
right’.  For  Kant,  see  The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  (translated  by  Mary  Gregor  for 
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997),  5:63;  for  Rawls,  A  Theory  of  Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2
nd ed., 1999), 27-28.  On Having a Good 
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But then again, when we view ourselves as agents, we view ourselves in turn as 
functional systems.
22  For to be an agent is to be essentially subject to a standard of success 
and failure, and to be subject to a standard of success and failure in the very same way that a 
functional system is.  Here’s what I have in mind.  A functional system – let’s say a machine 
– is designed to achieve a certain end. If it does not achieve its end, we say that it has failed.  
You were late this morning, you say, apologetically, because your alarm clock broke down 
and failed to go off.  But to be successful, it is not enough that your alarm clock goes off 
from any cause whatever.  If the alarm rings because a sudden jolt of electricity happens to 
break a spring which accidentally hits the mechanism that sets off the alarm at 7:00 a.m. 
precisely, it is not a good clock.  A functional system, to be successful, has to be the kind of 
thing that reliably achieves its end.   
In the same way, the kind of success that we associate with agency is not exhausted 
by the idea of the agent actually bringing the end about, since an agent who brought about 
his end only accidentally – say by a deviant causal pathway – would have failed as an agent. If 
I fire my gun wildly astray, but the bullet ricochets off a cast iron fence and happens to hit 
the target in exactly the spot that I intended, I have not made a good shot. Indeed, once I 
understand the causal situation, I should feel that I have been the beneficiary of a lucky 
accident, that is:  that I didn’t really do anything at all. To be successful in action is not merely 
                                                 
22 The remarks that follow are borrowed from  ‘The Normative Constitution of Agency,’ 
(forthcoming in Rational  and  Social  Agency:  Essays  on  the  Philosophy  of  Michael  Bratman, ed. 
Manual Vargas and Gideon Yaffe (New York: Oxford University Press), §1.3.  On Having a Good 
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to do something that brings about your end. To be successful in action is to make yourself 
into the kind of thing that reliably achieves that end.
23   
So to regard yourself as an agent is to regard yourself as a functional system, and to 
regard yourself as a functional system is to regard yourself as having a good, in the functional 
sense of good.  But now it is not only the functional sense of good.  For if you regard the 
thing you aim at as a final good – that is, as something worth going for – then you regard the 
things that promote it, your own condition included, as good in that way too. An agent 
necessarily values his own efficacy, and therefore necessarily values his own functional good 
as an aspect of his final good.   
 
6. Why Some Things Have a Good in the Final Sense
24 
One more step is necessary. When we regard an organism as a functional system, we 
regard its end as being, as I said earlier, something along these lines:  to maintain itself, to 
survive and reproduce, or to live the life characteristic of its kind. The end of an organism is, 
                                                 
23 Our self-consciousness about our agential success and failure is thus the source of the first 
primitive normative thoughts that leads us to the idea of well-functioning and from there to 
normative thought more generally.  Notice the close tie this provides between normative 
thought and the first-person perspective.  And notice too that a failure of efficacy is not the 
only route to the idea of a failure of one’s agency; a failure of autonomy provides another 
such route.  See Self-Constitution, §5.1.  I am indebted here to discussion with Alan Code. 
24  For another version of the argument of this section, see ‘The Origin of the Good and Our 
Animal  Nature’,  forthcoming  in  Problems  of  Goodness:  New  Essays  on  Metaethics,  edited  by 
Bastian Reichardt.  On Having a Good 
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in a sense, simply to be and to continue being what it is, or as I have put it elsewhere, to 
constitute itself.
25   
Now if the organism is an agent – roughly speaking, an animal or a person – the way 
that she constitutes herself is in part by having conscious states that track, at least roughly 
and defeasibly, what is good or bad for her in the functional sense.  An animal that has any 
chance of surviving must feel hungry when she needs food, fear in the face of predators and 
threats, and pain in the face of conditions that are damaging to her.  She must perceive what is 
good for her in the functional sense as attractive and what is bad for her in the functional 
sense as aversive, and those perceptions must determine what she decides to go for and what 
to avoid.
26  If the organism is a rational agent, then she will do some of this consciously, 
using the word ‘good’ to designate the things that are good for her in the functional sense 
when she decides to go for them.  She conceives the things that are good for her to be good 
things in the final sense, and as such she decides to go for them.   
Before I said that the motherly or what I am now calling the functional sense of 
good for you and the final sense of good for you name the same set of facts from two 
different perspectives. In one, we view the entity as a functional system and in the other, we 
view the things that are good for the entity from the entity’s own point of view.  I have now 
explained why that is so.  Animals perceive, and rational animals also conceive, what is good for 
them as something to go for, and so as what is good for them in the final sense too.  What is 
                                                 
25 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, especially §2.2.  
26 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, §6.1.2.  On Having a Good 
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functionally good for them, in the broad sense I have been describing, is also good from 
their point of view, and so is their final good.
27   
Now let me avert some possible confusions. First, I am not claiming that anything 
that seems good from your point of view is therefore actually good for you, in either the 
functional or the final sense.  We are highly imperfect functional systems, and therefore we 
can get it wrong:  what seems good to us may not be good for us after all. Importantly, 
because  you  are  a  functional  system  that  works  by  tracking  your  own  good  through 
perception and thought, when you do get it wrong you are malfunctioning.  The very fact 
that you don’t know what’s good for you is, in a way, a large part of what is wrong.  
Second,  I  am  not  claiming  that  the  final  good  for  people  is  survival  and 
reproduction, or simple self-maintenance, or even to lead a healthy life of our kind.  That is, 
I  am  not  claiming  that,  unless  we  take  a  capacious  view  of  what  is  involved  in  self-
maintenance, or in leading a healthy life of our kind.  For first of all, recall that I have argued 
that  even  the  functional  sense  of  good-for  extends  to  things  that  both  promote  and 
constitute  our  psychological,  moral,  and  spiritual  health  as  well  as  our  physical  health.  
Second (or maybe this is the same), elsewhere I have argued that the human project of self-
constitution involves the adoption and maintenance of what I call ‘practical identities,’ ‘the 
roles and relationships in terms of which we value ourselves and find our lives worth living 
and our actions worth undertaking.’
28  For us, the functional sense of good-for and therefore 
                                                 
27 Notice an important consequence of this story:  valuing is prior to value.  It is because 
there are things that necessarily strike agents as things to go for, that there are final goods. 
28 I introduce the notion of practical identity in The Sources of Normativity, 101.  For further 
discussion, see Self-Constitution, §1.4.  On Having a Good 
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the final sense too will include whatever promotes and constitutes our practical identities.
29 
Formally speaking, my view is a rather obvious one:  that the human good is being able to 
make something valuable or worthwhile of ourselves.
30   
Nor, thirdly, am I saying that the things that promote and constitute our practical 
identities are good only because they promote and constitute our practical identities, and so 
only good in a vaguely instrumental sense.  That would be the same mistake as thinking the 
things that promote and constitute health are instrumental because they promote survival. 
Like health, the successful maintenance of our practical identities is the excellence of our 
lives. The things that promote and constitute the maintenance of our practical identities are 
final goods because as self-constituting beings, we see them as things to go for.   
 
7. The Problem Cases 
  I have argued that having a good cannot just be a matter of standing in a special 
relation to something that is, as it were, already, independently good.  Just as nothing counts 
as a hand unless it is related to the nervous system of an animal in a quite particular way, so 
nothing counts as a good until it is related to an agent in a quite particular way.  An animal 
                                                 
29 This is why ‘final’ isn’t a great word here (see note 12): because this sense of good also 
encompasses the things that promote the things we decide to pursue for their own sakes.  
30 That  is,  the  human  good  is  carrying  out  the  particularly  normative  form  of  self-
constitution particular to our kind, the rational kind.  What gives content to ‘valuable’ here?  
First, in Self-Constitution I argued that morality is necessary for successful self-constitution. I 
also  describe  the  way  thoughts  about  value  more  generally  can  get  a  footing  in  Self-
Constitution, §10.1.4.  On Having a Good 
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whose nervous system makes it possible to wiggle his fingers without manipulating them 
externally has a hand.  An entity whose functional organization involves her tending to that 
very functional organization, that is, looking after it, through action, has a good, in the final 
sense  of  good.  These  claims  are  parallel:  hands  and  final  goods  are  artifacts  of  these 
relationships.   
  On this account, what most obviously has a good are individual people and animals.  
Since those are the things that most obviously have a good, I take that to be a virtue of the 
account. We can now have many arguments about what sorts of things count as agents and 
what would be good for them.  But according to my account everything that has a good is an 
agent, and everything good is, necessarily, some agent’s good.  This brings us back finally to 
the problem cases I mentioned at the outset. It seems hard to explain why we are tempted by 
the idea that a universe full of happy people and animals is better than a universe full of 
miserable ones, since if the people and animals involved in the two cases are different people 
and animals, then there is no one for whom it is better.  It seems hard to explain why we are 
tempted by the idea that a society in which wealth is distributed more equally is better, since 
although it is plainly better for some people, who would otherwise be poor, it is also plainly 
worse for others, who would otherwise be rich.  Obviously these are not the only problem 
cases.  But I will end by discussing these two cases, to give you a sense of how I think we 
should handle these issues.   
  As I mentioned early on, one way to approach the problem of the two universes 
would be to try to make it out that the universe is itself the kind of agent for whom things 
can be good or bad.  Then perhaps it is better for the universe if it is full of happy people and 
animals than if it is full of miserable ones?  During his science television series Cosmos, Carl On Having a Good 
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Sagan at one point suggested rather impressively that humanity represents the way in which 
the universe comes to know itself.
31  It’s a pretty thought, although I’m not sure a Kantian 
can  accept  it.  But  never  mind  that.  Could  the  idea  that  we  somehow  count  as  the 
consciousness of the universe give us grounds for thinking of the universe as an agent for 
whom things can be good or bad?   
  Obviously there are some difficulties here.  One is that even if we did think so it is 
not clear why it would be better for the universe to be full of happy people and animals, 
unless we also think its function is to support happy life.
32 More importantly, though, when 
we have the thought that the universe full of miserable life is not as good as the universe full 
of happy life, it is not because we are sympathizing with the universe. It is because we are 
sympathizing with the people and animals who are in the universe, and we find the thought 
of their happiness pleasing.  In fact, that in itself is already part of the explanation of why we 
tend to think that the universe full of happy life is better.  For you should notice that on the 
account of the good that I have given, sympathy plays an essential role in the way the 
concept functions.  According to my account, we arrive at the idea of the final good when 
we look at the world in the way that a certain kind of entity – one that functions by tracking 
its own functional good through perception and thought – looks at the world.  That means 
that any thoughts I have about what is good for you are essentially sympathetic.  But it is not 
that we are pleased when we sympathize with happy people and animals because we believe 
independently of sympathy that their happiness is a good thing.  If we believed that, we 
                                                 
31 Quoted on the Carl Sagan website at http://www.carlsagan.com/. 
32 Sagan’s idea that we are the consciousness of the universe would explain the temptation to 
think that, I suppose.  On Having a Good 
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could be pleased by it without the aid of sympathy. Rather, they necessarily regard their 
happiness, or more properly speaking the conditions that constitute it, is as something to go 
for, something worthy of pursuit.  And then when we sympathize with them, we regard their 
happiness, and the things that constitute,  that way too.
33  That’s why we see it as good.
34 
  The larger point I am trying to make here is that we cannot completely divorce 
thoughts about the good from thoughts about what to go for, given that the original home 
of the concept is, so to speak, in the deliberative standpoint.  That’s why I asked you to keep 
in mind, earlier, the way in which the problems named by ‘the right’ and ‘the good’ are 
interlocking.   For I think we will find the answer to the question we are asking now in that 
fact.  
When we think about the comparison between the goodness of two universes, it is 
impossible not to import thoughts about which of the two we would bring into existence 
were we in the position of the creator and therefore faced with that choice.  If we were, I 
think we all agree, we would certainly bring into existence the universe full of happy people 
and animals if we could.  But that’s not because it contains more happiness and happiness is 
impersonally good.  It’s because if you are the creator, then it is right, that is, it is your duty, 
to do as well as you can for whomever you create. So the universe full of happy people and 
animals is not exactly more worthy of choice because it is better.  Rather, it is better – and 
                                                 
33  The ‘or rather, the conditions which constitute it’ is there because I am among those who 
don’t believe that people characteristically pursue happiness.  I believe we pursue projects we 
think are worthwhile, and are happy when we are succeeding in promoting or realizing those 
projects.  Saying that people pursue happiness is, at best, shorthand.  
34 This is another manifestation of the fact that valuing is prior to value.   On Having a Good 
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yes, in my view we do get that conclusion – because it is more worthy of choice.  But this is 
not to say that there is no one for whom it is better, and that no thought of the good guides 
the choice. The happier universe is better for whoever gets created.  But in order to explain why 
‘whoever gets created’ is the right way to single out the beneficiary of the choice in this case, 
we have to appeal to the deliberative context in which the choice is made, including any 
duties inherent in that deliberative context. 
When  we  are  deciding  to  have  children  or  enacting  legislation  that  will  affect 
population, we are also in the position of a creator.  That is why it makes perfect sense to 
say,  for  instance,  that  it  will  be  better  to  have  a  child  later  when  you  are  in  better 
circumstances, even though there is no genetically identifiable child for whom that is better.  
Your duty as a prospective parent is to do as well as you can for whatever child you have, 
not for some genetically identifiable individual who does not yet exist and may never do so. 
Notice also that Parfit’s famous repugnant conclusion – the conclusion that we must keep 
adding to the population until the conditions created by the crowding destroy the value of 
life, making it not worth living – is blocked by these arguments.
35  The world is not better 
with more total happiness in it, because there is no one for whom it is better, nor do we owe 
it to non-existent people to bring them into existence so that they can have a little fun.  Our 
                                                 
35 Parfit  first  introduced  the  Repugnant  Conclusion  in  chapter  17  of  Reasons  and  Persons 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).  The argument in the text bears generally against puzzles 
arising from the ‘non-identity’ problem – cases in which we can apparently do better by 
producing a better state of affairs for a genetically different individual.  These cases may be 
thought to support the idea of impersonal goods. I am arguing instead that it is not always 
right to identify the beneficiaries of action in terms of their genetic identities.  On Having a Good 
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duty, when we are settling population policy, is to the future inhabitants of the planet, whoever 
they are. 
As for equitable distributions, there are two important things to say about them, but 
they come to the same thing.  The first is modeled exactly on what I said about the two 
universes.  More equitable distributions, like universes full of happy people and animals, are 
better because they are more worthy of choice, in the context in which one chooses a system 
of distribution, which is when one is setting up a basic structure for society.  In order to 
learn why the more equitable distribution is more worthy of choice, all you have to do now 
is read John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, to find out why in these circumstances, a more equitable 
distribution is the one that would be chosen.
36  Here, as in the case of the two universes, the 
choice is governed by thoughts about what is better for someone.  First, the parties in the 
original position make the choice asking what, under the veil of ignorance, will be better for 
themselves.  But that is only a step along the way.  The more important point is that we 
readers who make the thought experiment of entering the original position are undertaking 
to make the choice in the way that will be best for a citizen of a liberal society considered 
merely as such.  Again, the context of the choice explains why that is the beneficiary we 
should be thinking of in this kind of case.  
                                                 
36 In fact, the reason why I keep using ‘more equitable’ rather than ‘equal’ is because I think a 
distribution  according  to  Rawls’s  difference  principle  (the  principle  of  choosing  the 
distribution that is the best for the worst off) is preferable to a strictly egalitarian one.  See A 
Theory of Justice, Chapters 2 and 3.  On Having a Good 
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The other thing to say is that the political state, unlike the universe, is a kind of agent 
– indeed, according to my own arguments in Self-Constitution, a self-constituting one.
37  We 
might think that there are all kinds of ways in which the state, considered simply as such, is 
better off if there are more equitable distributions.  More equitable distributions support a 
middle class, with all the benefits to stability and culture that a middle class is supposed to 
provide.  In the end, I think that this comes to the same thing, though.  The benefits of 
stability  and  culture  ultimately  accrue  to  the  citizen,  considered  just  as  such.    In  both 
arguments, the beneficiary of the state is the representative citizen, and we look to what is 
good for her.  But the reason we do so is because it is to her that the arrangements of the 
state must be justified, and not to some genetically identifiable individual.  The state has no 
good of its own that is not the good of the representative citizen.   
This is not to say that there are not other kinds of collective agents that do have such 
a good, say, corporations or universities or clubs.  But it is a particularly important point to 
make about the state.  The state’s interests can come into conflict with yours, considering 
you as a private individual.  But it cannot come into conflict with yours, considering you as a 
representative citizen. That there should be occasion to sacrifice the citizen for the good of 
the state is a logical impossibility. 
 
9. Conclusion 
  In this paper I have argued that the concept of someone’s having a good is prior to 
the concept of something’s being good – just as the concept of having a hand is prior to the 
concept of something’s being a hand.  An agent is the sort of thing that has a final good, 
                                                 
37 See Self-Constitution, Chapter 7. On Having a Good 
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because an agent necessarily regards her own well-functioning as something to go for.  I 
think it follows that everything that is good in the final sense must be good for someone.  
Using the case of the two universes, I’ve tried to indicate how I would handle cases in which 
our intuitions might seem to be ones that we can explain only by appeal to impersonal 
goods.  What’s really happening in these cases is not that we are appealing to impersonal 
goods, but rather that the designation of the relevant beneficiaries is given by the nature of 
the choice that is being made.  Where there was really no choice between the universe full of 
happy inhabitants and the universe full of miserable ones, there would be no fact about 
which one was better – but then, because the question raised by the concept of the good is 
the question what to do go for, there would also be no occasion for making the judgment.  I 
believe  that  these  arguments  vindicate  the  existential  claim  I  started  out  from:  the  only 
reason why anything matters is because the world contains entities for whom things can be 
good or bad.
38 
 
                                                 
38 This paper was delivered as the The Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture in March 2012, 
Suarez Lecture at Fordham in April 2013, and as one of the Agnes Cumin Lectures at 
University College Dublin in March. I am indebted to audiences for helpful discussion on all 
of  these  occasions  and  at  colloquia  at  Stanford,  the  CUNY  Graduate  Center,  SUNY-
Binghamton, Brandeis, and the Georg-August University in Göttengen. 